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#### The affirmatives performances of self trades off with collective mobilization to address the structural repression of people of color. They offer the false hope of symbolic solutions to material problems

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(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

Approaching public controversies through a conversational model informed by therapy also enables political inaction in two respects. First, an open-ended process lacking mechanisms for closure thwarts progress toward resolution. As Freeman writes of consciousness raising, an unstructured, informal discussion [End Page 418] "leaves people with no place to go and the lack of structure leaves them with no way of getting there."70 Second, the therapeutic impulse to emphasize the self as both problem and solution ignores structural impediments constraining individual agency. "Therapy," Cloud argues, "offers consolation rather than compensation, individual adaptation rather than social change, and an experience of politics that is impoverished in its isolation from structural critique and collective action." Public discourse emphasizing healing and coping, she claims, "locates blame and responsibility for solutions in the private sphere."71¶ Clinton's Conversation on Race not only exemplified the frequent wedding of public dialogue and therapeutic themes but also illustrated the failure of a conversation-as-counseling model to achieve meaningful social reform. In his speech inaugurating the initiative, Clinton said, "Basing our self-esteem on the ability to look down on others is not the American way . . . Honest dialogue will not be easy at first . . . Emotions may be rubbed raw, but we must begin." Tempering his stated goal of "concrete solutions" was the caveat that "power cannot compel" racial "community," which "can come only from the human spirit."72¶ Following the president's cue to self-disclose emotions, citizens chiefly aired personal experiences and perspectives during the various community dialogues. In keeping with their talk-show formats, the forums showcased what Orlando Patterson described as "performative 'race' talk," "public speech acts" of denial, proclamation, defense, exhortation, and even apology, in short, performances of "self" that left little room for productive public argument.73 Such personal evidence overshadowed the "facts" and "realities" Clinton also had promised to explore, including, for example, statistics on discrimination patterns in employment, lending, and criminal justice or expert testimony on cycles of dependency, poverty, illegitimacy, and violence.¶ Whereas Clinton had encouraged "honest dialogue" in the name of "responsibility" and "community," Burke argues that "The Cathartic Principle" often produces the reverse. "[C]onfessional," he writes, "contains in itself a kind of 'personal irresponsibility,' as we may even relieve ourselves of private burdens by befouling the public medium." More to the point, "a thoroughly 'confessional' art may enact a kind of 'individual salvation at the expense of the group,'" performing a "sinister function, from the standpoint of overall-social necessities."74 Frustrated observers of the racial dialogue—many of them African Americans—echoed Burke's concerns. Patterson, for example, noted, "when a young Euro-American woman spent nearly five minutes of our 'conversation' in Martha's Vineyard . . . publicly confessing her racial insensitivities, she was directly unburdening herself of all sorts of racial guilt feeling. There was nothing to argue about."75 Boston Globe columnist Derrick Z. Jackson invoked the game metaphor communication theorists often link to [End Page 419] skills in conversation,76 voicing suspicion of a talking cure for racial ailments that included neither exhaustive racial data nor concrete goals. "The game," wrote Jackson, "is to get 'rid' of responsibility for racism while doing nothing to solve it."77 Contributing to the ineffectiveness of a therapeutic approach in redressing social problems is its common pairing with what Burke terms "incantatory" imagery, wherein rhetors invite persons to see themselves in an idealized form. Comparing a current conflicted self against a future self individuals aspire to become is a therapeutic staple, a technique Clinton mimics in his speech on race. In one breath, he acknowledges persistent racial "discrimination and prejudice"; in another, he overtly invites audience members to picture themselves in saintly fashion: "Can we be one America respecting, even celebrating, our differences, but embracing even more what we have in common?"79 But outside private therapy, this strategy rarely results in honest self-disclosure, especially regarding thorny issues such as race. Andrew Hacker argues that individuals seldom speak candidly about race in public; rather, they express an "idealized" self with ideas and feelings they desire or, more commonly, believe they should possess, a phenomenon evident even in anonymous polling.80 The hazard of blending the confessional with the incantatory, Burke writes, is a "sentimental and hypocritical" false reassurance that society is on the proper course, rendering remedial action unnecessary.81 This danger is compounded if the problem initially has been couched as essentially attitudinal rather than structural, as Clinton did: "We have torn down the barriers in our laws. Now we must break down the barriers in our lives, our minds and our hearts."82 Indeed, in commenting on the therapeutic bent of the Conversation on Race, William L. Taylor argues that the late Bayard Rustin's reservations about the social-psychological approach to race were prescient: "Rustin said he could envision America being persuaded figuratively to lie down on the psychiatrist's couch to examine their feelings about race. They would likely arise, he said, pronouncing themselves either free or purged of any bias. And nothing would have changed."83 Furthermore, identification intrinsic in narrative experiences is double-edged; while identification can neutralize domination by creating empathy, identification also can fortify hegemony. As Cornell West warns, the privileging of emotional responses to racism and racial self-identities over other data can contribute to "racial reasoning," which blacks employ to their peril. To illustrate, he points to the failure of black leadership to challenge the qualifications by typical measures of black Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas, opting instead to submit to deceptive racial solidarity built upon premises of "black authenticity." Because the problems plaguing contemporary black America, West writes, result from a complex amalgam of structural and behavioral factors, weaving solutions demands analysis of data beyond subjective personal narratives and performances of self-identity. The Conversation on Race visibly demonstrates the inertia endemic in a discursive model lacking direction and mechanisms for closure. Five months into the racial dialogue, White House aides conceded no consensus had emerged even on fundamental goals: whether the initiative should formulate race-related policy or merely explore racial attitudes.86 Moreover, Clinton himself expressed weariness over the failure in public meetings to move beyond the repetitive airing of personal opinion on issues such as affirmative action,87 concurring with critics that "we need structure for the discussion . . . so we can actually get something done."88 Months more of racial conversation, however, produced few substantive results. The University of New Hampshire's extended dialogue over the proposed conversational forum engendered similar fatigue and inaction. Arguments forwarded by both camps centered on pivotal differences between "debate" and "conversation," problem-solving tasks and relational aims, and formal and informal modes of gauging opinions. Ironically, more than one lengthy "conversation" over the conversational proposal produced no action, leading one exhausted participant to observe, "This [process] goes to the heart of my frustration with ever making this [conversational Forum] viable."89 As Burke maintains, while some symbolic forms contain "a 'way in,' 'way through,' and 'way out,'" others "lead us in and leave us there."90 Finally, a key weakness in a dialogic model for treating systemic social problems is its reliance on a crucial non-sequitur: increased intimacy will spawn an ethic of care, which, in turn, will produce an ethic of justice.91 But at the University of New Hampshire, the mistrust and estrangement that a "real conversation" purportedly would rectify had resulted, not from a lack of familiarity among principals, but from structural concerns, including the widening gap between faculty and administrative salaries, shrinking resources, and maneuvers to erode faculty governance. Likewise, the personal proximity between white families and their black slaves or servants reveals that intimacy means little in the face of structural inequities, nor does it necessarily induce removal of injustices. Illustrative is the recent revelation that South Carolina senator Strom Thurmond had fathered a daughter by his family's black domestic in 1925, an intimacy that failed to alter the 1948 Dixiecrat presidential candidate's stance on segregation.92 Similarly, although the lessening of hostility over abortion reported by some participants in the Public Conversations Project may have some merit, project leaders themselves concede their "vision for a 'conflict resolution' process for a complex issue [such as abortion] is not necessarily resolution."93 As such, the utility of such dialogues on public policies affecting the material lives of women seeking legal reproductive choices is sorely limited. As [End Page 421] Burke notes when drawing crucial distinctions between psychological and material spheres, "[T]o some degree, solution of conflict must always be done purely in the symbolic realm (by 'transcendence') if it is to be done at all." Still, a "symbolic drama," he writes, differs from "the drama of living . . . and [its] real obstacles . . . Hence, at times [people] try to solve symbolically kinds of conflict that can and should be solved by material means. Indeed, as Clinton rightly said in launching his Conversation on Race, political or military power cannot compel caring. Yet political power can command justice as evidenced in the nation's record of dismantling racial and gender barriers through judicial and legislative means.

#### This means the affirmative actively provides fuel to the fire of hegemonic debate practices. As long as the community provides an avenue for self-expression, the issue is resolved. This actively discourages structural solutions to problems of inequality because it makes narrative as a sufficient remedy.

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(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

Fourth, a communicative model that views public issues through a relational, personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political inaction. Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is achieving an instrumental goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops with self-expression. As Schudson puts it, "Conversation has no end outside itself."39 Similarly, modeling therapeutic paradigms that trumpet "talking cures" can discourage a search for political solutions to public problems by casting cathartic talk as sufficient remedy. As Campbell's analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the women's liberation movement points out, "[S]olutions must be structural, not merely personal, and analysis must move beyond personal experience and feeling . . . Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign . . . [but] only the very limited realm of therapeutic, small group interaction."40¶ Finally, and related, a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to locate the source and solution to such ills solely within the individual, the "self-help" on which much therapy rests. A postmodern therapeutic framing of conflicts as relational misunderstandings occasioned by a lack of dialogue not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring (rather than, say, irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, provides cover for ignoring the structural dimensions of social problems such as disproportionate black [End Page 412] poverty. If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction, as Sheila McNamee claims, all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material circumstance, enabling defenders of the status quo to admonish citizens to "heal" themselves.

#### **Their politics of resistance are politically amorphous. They refuse to be tied down to particular strategies and are more concerned with what they stand against than what they stand for. This is a focus on personal empowerment rather than wider social change, which builds up the legitimacy of liberalism by providing venues for the subject to assert him or herself. The affirmative ensures that everyone feels empowered, but nobody actually is.**

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(Wendy, States of Injury, 21-3)

For some, fueled by opprobrium toward regulatory norms or other modalities of domination, the language of "resistance" has taken up the ground vacated by a more expansive practice of freedom. For others, it is the discourse of “empowerment” that carries the ghost of freedom's valence ¶ 22¶. Yet as many have noted, insofar as resistance is an effect of the regime it opposes on the one hand, and insofar as its practitioners often seek to void it of normativity to differentiate it from the (regulatory) nature of what it opposes on the other, it is at best politically rebellious; at worst, politically amorphous. Resistance stands against, not for; it is re-action to domination, rarely willing to admit to a desire for it, and it is neutral with regard to possible political direction. Resistance is in no way constrained to a radical or emancipatory aim. a fact that emerges clearly as soon as one analogizes Foucault's notion of resistance to its companion terms in Freud or Nietzsche. Yet in some ways this point is less a critique of Foucault, who especially in his later years made clear that his political commitments were not identical with his theoretical ones (and un- apologetically revised the latter), than a sign of his misappropriation. For Foucault, resistance marks the presence of power and expands our under- standing of its mechanics, but it is in this regard an analytical strategy rather than an expressly political one. "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet. or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power. . . . (T]he strictly relational character of power relationships . . . depends upon a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations.\*39 This appreciation of the extent to which resistance is by no means inherently subversive of power also reminds us that it is only by recourse to a very non-Foucaultian moral evaluation of power as bad or that which is to be overcome that it is possible to equate resistance with that which is good, progressive, or seeking an end to domination. ¶ If popular and academic notions of resistance attach, however weakly at times, to a tradition of protest, the other contemporary substitute for a discourse of freedom—“empowerment”—would seem to correspond more closely to a tradition of idealist reconciliation. The language of resistance implicitly acknowledges the extent to which protest always transpires inside the regime; “empowerment,” in contrast, registers the possibility of generating one’s capacities, one’s “self-esteem,” one’s life course, without capitulating to constraints by particular regimes of power. But in so doing, contemporary discourses of empowerment too often signal an oddly adaptive and harmonious relationship with domination insofar as they locate an individual’s sense of worth and capacity in the register of individual feelings, a register implicitly located on some- thing of an other worldly plane vis-a-vis social and political power. In this regard, despite its apparent locution of resistance to subjection, contemporary discourses of empowerment partake strongly of liberal solipsism—the radical decontextualization of the subject characteristic of¶ 23¶ liberal discourse that is key to the fictional sovereign individualism of liberalism. Moreover, in its almost exclusive focus on subjects’ emotional bearing and self-regard, empowerment is a formulation that converges with a regime’s own legitimacy needs in masking the power of the regime. This is not to suggest that talk of empowerment is always only illusion or delusion. It is to argue, rather, that while the notion of empowerment articulates that feature of freedom concerned with action, with being more than the consumer subject figured in discourses of rights and economic democracy, contemporary deployments of that notion also draw so heavily on an undeconstructed subjectivity that they risk establishing a wide chasm between the (experience of) empowerment and an actual capacity to shape the terms of political, social, or economic life. Indeed, the possibility that one can “feel empowered” without being so forms an important element of legitimacy for the antidemocratic dimensions of liberalism.

#### Instead of the affirmative’s self focused strategy, we offer a strategy of political resistance against the structures of white supremacy

#### There are two components of this strategy—

#### The first is what we do—we identify a political strategy of historical study over the ability of nonviolence to challenge institutions of domination

#### We present the following case studies in order to challenge dominant narratives that valorize armed struggle and dismiss the power of nonviolent resistance:

#### Ghana - nonviolent resistance was able to quickly and successfully overthrow imperialist repression

Bartkowski 13, Senior Director at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict

(Maciej, Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles, pg. 63)

The newly independent state of Ghana took a leading role in advocating and using civil resistance. In Deember 1958 independent Ghana hosted the All-African Peoples’ Conference, a follow-up to the 1945 Pan-African Congress. Patrice Lumumba and Tom Mboya were there along with a large Algerian contingent. In his opening speech, Nkrumah attributed the success of the Ghanaian independence movement to nonviolent positive action. Kojo Botsio, who led the CPP delegation, told countries still struggle for liberation that, “with the united will of the people behind you, the power of the imperialists can be destroyed without the use of violence.” Some delegations were unhappy with the emphasis on nonviolent resistance, especially the Algerians and Egyptians who “regarded the very word ‘nonviolence’ as an insult to brothers fighting and dying for freedom.” Ultimately, the congress declared its support for peaceful means in territories where democratic means were available but also supported those in circumstances where arms were the only protection from colonial violence. In 1959, after hearing that France planned to test nuclear weapons in the Sahara Desert at Regan, Algeria, a group of eleven Ghanaians along with British and other international activists attempted to intervene nonviolently, but were ejected from French territory in Upper Volta and ended up back in Ghana. Another conference to discuss the way forward for positive action was held in Accra in April 1960, Positive Action for Peace and Security in Africa. While Nkrumah opened the conference with a speech advocating “nonviolent positive action” as the main tactic, after the criticism of Frantz Fanon and pressure from some other African delegates, the conference’s emphasis on continent –wide nonviolent positive action was muted. Nevertheless, Bill Sutherland and Matt Meyer describe positive action as being “a phenomenal success for Gandhian strategy.” Nonviolent tactics were used as part of a self-conscious overall nonviolent strategy that led Ghana quickly to independence with minimal casualities. They included consciousness-raising among the people about their right to self-government, a determination to act in concert with each other through a variety of associations, and a willingness to accept imprisonment. Boycotts and strikes showed the people that withdrawing cooperation leaves colonial forces powerless (and that cooperation reinforces subjection). Many marginalized sectors of society were mobilized in a common cause, including the youth, market women, and elementary school graduates. Newspapers and popular songs spread the message of the movement and the leaders emphasis on the need for nonviolent discipline resonated with people’s deeply held value systems. There was the grace to accept compromise in certain situations as well as the determination to go the harder way of strikes and imprisonment when sacrifice was required. The impact of mass nonviolent civil resistance on shaping Ghanaian nationalism needs further exploration, but it is clear – if rarely acknowledged – that if facilitated this process of nation building.

#### Algeria – They tried violent resistance first and it failed but nonviolent struggle was able to dismantle colonial occupation

Bartkowski 13, Senior Director at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict

(Maciej, Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles, pg. 120)

French colonization in Algeria was one of the most intense colonial encounters of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The severity of the socioeconomic disruption caused by the colonial regime and the harsh conditions of the French colonization in Algeria (including the massacres of May 1945) limited the range of possible forms of collective activities. The face that political parties and unions developed later in Algeria than they did in other North African countries (Tunisia or Egypt) was undoubtedly linked to the breakdown of Algerian society in the face of colonization. When armed insurrections failed to repel military conquest and occupation, the population adopted strategies of persistent endurance and survival. Emigration and more muted forms of resistance, such as withdrawal into more intimate and private domains of family life, are difficult for historians to assess. It was only with the emergence of the Jeunes Algeriens and the development of cultural associations in the 1920s that this endurance took on public dimensions that were more constructive and collective. Collective activities became a means of moving away from simple survival to more proactive initiatives of rebuilding the social fabric and reinvigorating colonized society, despite ongoing restrictive and oppressive colonial policies. Political parties succeeded in drawing on a repertoire of nonviolent actions to mobilize in the nationalist cause, but their lack of unity and reluctance to use more forceful nonviolent methods such as general strikes made them ineffective in securing serious political concessions. This partly explains the teleological narrative of the Algerian history promoted by the FLN after independence. Consequently, national identity construed after the colonial war was formed on a double denial of plurality – a plurality of political ideologies and nationalist parties and their contribution to the struggle for an independent state; and a plurality in understandings of what Algerianness meant and embodied. This kind of discourse denied in its entirety the value, role, impact, and legacy of unarmed forms of collective struggle. It was only after the 1988 demonstrations, when civic associations and political parties became legal again, that the intensity of past experiences of nonviolent organizing and actions appeared reactivated: within a few days, dozens of political parties were founded. Nonviolent practices and activist networks with philosophical, institutional, and practical roots in the preindependence period were suddenly mobilized again. Thus, the decades of nationalist mythology had failed to erase them entirely.

Poland – Nonviolent resistance was the key to throw off occupation but official histories have covered these success stories up in favor of glorified violent struggle

Bartkowski 13, Senior Director at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict

(Maciej, Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles, pg. 274)

A critical attitude toward organic work is particularly perplexing given the extent to which the nineteenth-century nonviolent resistance and its constructive program of creating and running parallel institutions served as an inspiration for future generations of Poles faced with oppression. The conspiratorial experience of organizing and running secret education became ingrained in the collective memory of the national resistance. It was recalled during traumatic events such as the German occupation of 1939 – 1945 and during communist rule, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s when widespread illegal education (including the reestablishment of the flying university) ensured the truthful reading of national history, culture, and tradition. In fact, working at the base of society became the imperative nonviolent strategy of the anticommunist opposition. Solidarity leaders drew parallels between their nonviolent efforts to liberate the society from the control of the communist government and the nonviolent strategies of nineteenth century organicists to undermine the authority of the partitioning powers. Bohdan Cywinski’s influential Genealogy of the Defiant (1971) studied the fin-de-siecle (defiant ones) and made parallels between their nonviolent defiant attitude and practice against the czarist government and the then contemporary resistance to communism. That book inspired thousands of Poles and showed clearly how a century old tradition of nonviolent resistance – although generally underappreciated in the national annals – could play a vital role in shaping the thinking, and determining the strategies and actions, of a new generation of unarmed resisters struggling with no less oppressive autocratic rulers than their indomitable predecessors who lived under partitions. Without nonviolent resistance, Poles could not have taken charge of their national destiny after World War I or changed the geopolitical situation in their favor during the 1980s. It would have been equally implausible to integrate partitioned lands after 1918 and establish statehood so swiftly without the base of social, economic, and cultural development constructed through organic work. Although nonviolent resistance has been widely used by different generations of Poles against both external occupation and domestic dictatorship, this form of struggle is still awaiting much-deserved recognition of its role in not only defending, but essentially reimagining, the Polish nation.

#### Second is what that should lead to—we say that should lead to and be guided by a goal of ending racial targeting and violence including but not limited to the war on drugs

#### The war on drugs is a racially targeted means of re-imposing Jim Crow – in combination with the criminal justice system it’s created a racial caste system that keeps millions of people of color imprisoned and impoverished

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(Michelle, The War on Drugs and the New Jim Crow, urbanhabitat.org/20years/alexander)

Perhaps greater lies have been told in the past century, but they can be counted on one hand. Racial caste is alive and well in America. Most people don’t like it when I say this. It makes them angry. In the “era of colorblindness” there’s a nearly fanatical desire to cling to the myth that we as a nation have “moved beyond” race. Here are a few facts that run counter to that triumphant racial narrative: There are more African Americans under correctional control today—in prison or jail, on probation or parole—than were enslaved in 1850, a decade before the Civil War began. As of 2004, more African American men were disenfranchised (due to felon disenfranchisement laws) than in 1870, the year the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, prohibiting laws that explicitly deny the right to vote on the basis of race. A black child born today is less likely to be raised by both parents than a black child born during slavery. The recent disintegration of the African American family is due in large part to the mass imprisonment of black fathers. If you take into account prisoners, a large majority of African American men in some urban areas have been labeled felons for life. (In the Chicago area, the figure is nearly 80 percent.) These men are part of a growing undercaste—not class, caste—permanently relegated by law to a second-class status. They can be denied the right to vote, automatically excluded from juries, and legally discriminated against in employment, housing, access to education, and public benefits, much as their grandparents and great-grandparents were during the Jim Crow era. There is, of course, a colorblind explanation for all this: crime rates. Our prison population has exploded from about 300,000 to more than 2 million in a few short decades, it is said, because of rampant crime. We’re told that the reason so many black and brown men find themselves behind bars and ushered into a permanent, second-class status is because they happen to be the bad guys The uncomfortable truth, however, is that crime rates do not explain the sudden and dramatic mass incarceration of African Americans during the past 30 years. Crime rates have fluctuated over the last few decades—they are currently at historical lows—but imprisonment rates have consistently soared. Quintupled, in fact. And the vast majority of that increase is due to the War on Drugs. Drug offenses alone account for about two-thirds of the increase in the federal inmate population and more than half of the increase in the state prison population. The drug war has been brutal—complete with SWAT teams, tanks, bazookas, grenade launchers, and sweeps of entire neighborhoods—but those who live in white communities have little clue to the devastation wrought. This war has been waged almost exclusively in poor communities of color, even though studies consistently show that people of all colors use and sell illegal drugs at remarkably similar rates. In fact, some studies indicate that white youth are significantly more likely to engage in illegal drug dealing than black youth. Any notion that drug use among African Americans is more severe or dangerous is belied by the data. White youth, for example, have about three times the number of drug-related visits to the emergency room as their African American counterparts. That is not what you would guess, though, when entering our nation’s prisons and jails, overflowing as they are with black and brown drug offenders. In some states, African Americans comprise 80 to 90 percent of all drug offenders sent to prison. This is the point at which I am typically interrupted and reminded that black men have higher rates of violent crime. That’s why the drug war is waged in poor communities of color and not middle class suburbs. Drug warriors are trying to get rid of those drug kingpins and violent offenders who make ghetto communities a living hell. It has nothing to do with race; it’s all about violent crime. Again, not so. President Ronald Reagan officially declared the current drug war in 1982, when drug crime was declining, not rising. From the outset, the war had little to do with drug crime and nearly everything to do with racial politics. The drug war was part of a grand and highly successful Republican Party strategy of using racially coded political appeals on issues of crime and welfare to attract poor and working class white voters who were resentful of, and threatened by desegregation, busing, and affirmative action. In the words of H.R. Haldeman, President Richard Nixon’s White House Chief of Staff: “[T]he whole problem is really the blacks. The key is to devise a system that recognizes this while not appearing to.” A few years after the drug war was announced, crack cocaine hit the streets of inner-city communities. The Reagan administration seized on this development with glee, hiring staff who were to be responsible for publicizing inner-city crack babies, crack mothers, crack whores, and drug-related violence. The goal was to make inner-city crack abuse and violence a media sensation, bolstering public support for the drug war which, it was hoped, would lead Congress to devote millions of dollars in additional funding to it. The plan worked like a charm. For more than a decade, black drug dealers and users would be regulars in newspaper stories and would saturate the evening TV news. Congress and state legislatures nationwide would devote billions of dollars to the drug war and pass harsh mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes—sentences longer than murderers receive in many countries. Democrats began competing with Republicans to prove that they could be even tougher on the dark-skinned pariahs. In President Bill Clinton’s boastful words, “I can be nicked a lot, but no one can say I’m soft on crime.” The facts bear him out. Clinton’s “tough on crime” policies resulted in the largest increase in federal and state prison inmates of any president in American history. But Clinton was not satisfied with exploding prison populations. He and the “New Democrats” championed legislation banning drug felons from public housing (no matter how minor the offense) and denying them basic public benefits, including food stamps, for life. Discrimination in virtually every aspect of political, economic, and social life is now perfectly legal, if you’ve been labeled a felon. Facing Facts But what about all those violent criminals and drug kingpins? Isn’t the drug war waged in ghetto communities because that’s where the violent offenders can be found? The answer is yes... in made-for-TV movies. In real life, the answer is no. The drug war has never been focused on rooting out drug kingpins or violent offenders. Federal funding flows to those agencies that increase dramatically the volume of drug arrests, not the agencies most successful in bringing down the bosses. What gets rewarded in this war is sheer numbers of drug arrests. To make matters worse, federal drug forfeiture laws allow state and local law enforcement agencies to keep for their own use 80 percent of the cash, cars, and homes seized from drug suspects, thus granting law enforcement a direct monetary interest in the profitability of the drug market. The results have been predictable: people of color rounded up en masse for relatively minor, non-violent drug offenses. In 2005, four out of five drug arrests were for possession, only one out of five for sales. Most people in state prison have no history of violence or even of significant selling activity. In fact, during the 1990s—the period of the most dramatic expansion of the drug war—nearly 80 percent of the increase in drug arrests was for marijuana possession, a drug generally considered less harmful than alcohol or tobacco and at least as prevalent in middle-class white communities as in the inner city. In this way, a new racial undercaste has been created in an astonishingly short period of time—a new Jim Crow system. Millions of people of color are now saddled with criminal records and legally denied the very rights that their parents and grandparents fought for and, in some cases, died for. Affirmative action, though, has put a happy face on this racial reality. Seeing black people graduate from Harvard and Yale and become CEOs or corporate lawyers—not to mention president of the United States—causes us all to marvel at what a long way we’ve come. Recent data shows, though, that much of black progress is a myth. In many respects, African Americans are doing no better than they were when Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated and uprisings swept inner cities across America. Nearly a quarter of African Americans live below the poverty line today, approximately the same percentage as in 1968. The black child poverty rate is actually higher now than it was then. Unemployment rates in black communities rival those in Third World countries. And that’s with affirmative action! When we pull back the curtain and take a look at what our “colorblind” society creates without affirmative action, we see a familiar social, political, and economic structure—the structure of racial caste. The entrance into this new caste system can be found at the prison gate. This is not Martin Luther King, Jr.’s dream. This is not the promised land. The cyclical rebirth of caste in America is a recurring racial nightmare.

#### Only a foundational grounding in clear principles of nonviolence can facilitate a successful struggle for liberation. An approach that does not explicitly rule out violent tactics ensures an eventual move towards violence with counterproductive consequences

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(William, Social Movements and Strategic Nonviolence, www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/change/science\_nonviolence.html)

Despite the effectiveness of strategic nonviolence, complete adherence to it has been abandoned by some of the most visible and influential activists since the mid-1960s. This move toward the inclusion of violent acts in the repertoire of movement tactics began when Black Power advocates became increasingly impatient with the lack of responsiveness to plans for increasing political and economic integration after the Civil Rights Movement achieved its primary goals through the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. They were first deeply disappointed by the failure of the 1964 Democratic National Convention to seat the integrated delegation of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. That delegation was rejected, at the insistence of President Lyndon B. Johnson, except for two tokens, in favor of a racist delegation of tradition Southern Democrats who would not even pledge to support the Democratic nominee. It was truly a defining moment, a great divide between egalitarians and liberals within the Democratic Party on how to confront Southern white racists . Militant black activists also watched in despair as the conservative voting bloc continued to limit those kinds of government spending that might give African-Americans a chance to improve their economic position. Moreover, there was foot dragging and outright refusal by trade unions to integrate their apprenticeship programs. This situation suggested that the unionized white working class was not prepared to share good jobs with African-Americans, belying the support for civil rights by many union leaders. Nor was there any sign of a loosening in residential segregation, which meant among other things that African-Americans would not have access to the best public schools. For understandable but lamentable reasons, then, several top leaders in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee gave up on nonviolence and working with whites, creating conflict within the organization with those who wanted to continue as a nonviolent and integrated movement. Soon after, Black Power advocates won out in this argument, turning to inflammatory rhetoric about "taking up the gun" that threatened many whites and validated their worst fears. Black Power advocates then found allies in the North with the creation of the Black Panther Party, a self-identified revolutionary Marxist group, whose goals and armed confrontations with the police led to shoot outs and deaths in several cities. The Black Power stance of the Black Panthers and what remained of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee gave the movement for African-American equality and opportunity a violent and frightening image that alienated most whites. Feeling blocked on all sides, and doubting that whites would become any less prejudiced, many African-American communities exploded on their own, starting in south central Los Angeles in 1965, often in response to policy brutality, and with little or no prompting from Black Power advocates. These upheavals reached a peak in the extensive protests and property destruction in reaction to the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1968. Contrary to claims that they were aimless riots, they turned out to be more purposeful and targeted at specific businesses than was originally thought. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that jobs were created in response to these eruptions, and funding for existing government programs targeted at ghetto areas was increased. In the first few years after these long hot summers, it seemed like the uprisings had a pay-off, and therefore made some political sense. However, with the help of hindsight, a bigger fact needs to be faced: the long-term effects of the violence were negative. The outbursts were an understandable reaction to pent-up frustration and anger, and they had specific messages to deliver, but they were nonetheless a political mistake. The fact that they occurred shows the need for any future egalitarian movement to have its principles clear and in place before becoming involved in highly emotional events that are not easily understood or controlled as they unfold. It is not possible to spread the word about why violent disorders are not a good idea while they are happening. A new egalitarian movement would have to explain why they are unproductive well before they are on the horizon, not sit back and let them happen. For example, the gulf between blacks and whites expanded as the disruptions continued over several summers. Suspicion and anger were increased on both sides. Cities like Newark and Detroit still had not recovered from the withdrawal of investment 35 years later. "Law and order" became a code word for the enlargement of a criminal justice system that was used to control black communities. Some white voters in the North expressed their approval of a hard-line government approach by voting against the Democratic candidates for president in 1968 and 1972, helping to destroy the New Deal coalition in the process. Polls are also quite telling on the negative consequences of violence. While American public opinion gradually liberalized from the 1960s to the 1980s on a wide range of issues championed by egalitarian movements, such as women's rights, it went the other way on anything to do with violence and disorder. For example, from 1965 to 1969 there was a 26 percent rise in the percentage of people saying that courts were not harsh enough, bringing the total to 83 percent. Support for the death penalty declined from 73 percent in 1953 to 47 percent in 1965, but then jumped back up to 50 percent in 1966 and to 80 percent by 1980.

## 2NC

#### K disproves solvency and turns case

Tonn 5 – assoc. prof of comm. @ u of Maryland

(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

Perhaps the most conspicuous effort at replacing public debate with therapeutic dialogue was President Clinton's Conversation on Race, launched in mid-1997. Controversial from its inception for its ideological bent, the initiative met further widespread criticism for its encounter-group approaches to racial stratification and strife, critiques echoing previously articulated concerns—my own among them6 —that certain dangers lurk in employing private or social communication modes for public problem-solving.7 Since then, others have joined in contesting the treating of public problems with narrative and psychological approaches, which—in the name of promoting civility, cooperation, personal empowerment, and socially constructed or idiosyncratic truths—actually work to contain dissent, locate systemic social problems solely within individual neurosis, and otherwise fortify hegemony.8¶ Particularly noteworthy is Michael Schudson's challenge to the utopian equating of "conversation" with the "soul of democracy." Schudson points to pivotal differences in the goals and architecture of conversational and democratic deliberative processes. To him, political (or democratic) conversation is a contradiction in terms. Political deliberation entails a clear instrumental purpose, ideally remaining ever mindful of its implications beyond an individual case. Marked by disagreement—even pain—democratic deliberation contains transparent prescribed procedures governing participation and decision making so as to protect the timid or otherwise weak. In such processes, written records chronicle the interactional journey toward resolution, and in the case of writing law especially, provide accessible justification for decisions rendered. In sharp contrast, conversation is often "small talk" exchanged among family, friends, or candidates for intimacy, unbridled by set agendas, and prone to egocentric rather than altruistic goals. Subject only to unstated [End Page 406] "rules" such as turn-taking and politeness, conversation tends to advantage the gregarious or articulate over the shy or slight of tongue.9¶ The events of 9/11, the onset of war with Afghanistan and Iraq, and the subsequent failure to locate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction have resuscitated some faith in debate, argument, warrant, and facts as crucial to the public sphere. Still, the romance with public conversation persists. As examples among communication scholars, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's 2001 Carroll C. Arnold Distinguished Lecture treated what she termed "the rhetoric of conversation" as a means to "manage controversy" and empower non-dominant voices10 ; multiple essays in a 2002 special issue of Rhetoric & Public Affairs on deliberative democracy couch a deliberative democratic ideal in dialogic terms11 ; and the 2005 Southern States Communication Convention featured family therapist Sallyann Roth, founding member and trainer of the Public Conversations Project, as keynote speaker.12 Representative of the dialogic turn in deliberative democracy scholarship is Gerard A. Hauser and Chantal Benoit-Barne's critique of the traditional procedural, reasoning model of public problem solving: "A deliberative model of democracy . . . constru[es] democracy in terms of participation in the ongoing conversation about how we shall act and interact—our political relations" and "Civil society redirects our attention to the language of social dialogue on which our understanding of political interests and possibility rests."13 And on the political front, British Prime Minister Tony Blair—facing declining poll numbers and mounting criticism of his indifference to public opinion on issues ranging from the Iraq war to steep tuition hike proposals—launched The Big Conversation on November 28, 2003. Trumpeted as "as way of enriching the Labour Party's policy making process by listening to the British public about their priorities," the initiative includes an interactive government website and community meetings ostensibly designed to solicit citizens' voices on public issues.14 In their own way, each treatment of public conversation positions it as a democratic good, a mode that heals divisions and carves out spaces wherein ordinary voices can be heard. ¶ In certain ways, Schudson's initial reluctance to dismiss public conversation echoes my own early reservations, given the ideals of egalitarianism, empowerment, and mutual respect conversational advocates champion. Still, in the spirit of the dialectic ostensibly underlying dialogic premises, this essay argues that various negative consequences can result from transporting conversational and therapeutic paradigms into public problem solving. In what follows, I extend Schudson's critique of a conversational model for democracy in two ways: First, whereas Schudson primarily offers a theoretical analysis, I interrogate public conversation as a praxis in a variety of venues, illustrating how public "conversation" and "dialogue" have been coopted to silence rather [End Page 407] than empower marginalized or dissenting voices. In practice, public conversation easily can emulate what feminist political scientist Jo Freeman termed "the tyranny of structurelessness" in her classic 1970 critique of consciousness-raising groups in the women's liberation movement,15 as well as the key traits Irving L. Janis ascribes to "groupthink."16 Thus, contrary to its promotion as a means to neutralize hierarchy and exclusion in the public sphere, public conversation can and has accomplished the reverse. When such moves are rendered transparent, public conversation and dialogue, I contend, risk increasing rather than diminishing political cynicism and alienation. Second, whereas Schudson focuses largely on ways a conversational model for democracy may mute an individual's voice in crafting a resolution on a given question at a given time, I draw upon insights of Dana L. Cloud and others to consider ways in which a therapeutic, conversational approach to public problems can stymie productive, collective action in two respects.17 First, because conversation has no clearly defined goal, a public conversation may engender inertia as participants become mired in repeated airings of personal experiences without a mechanism to lend such expressions direction and closure. As Freeman aptly notes, although "[u]nstructured groups may be very effective in getting [people] to talk about their lives[,] they aren't very good for getting things done. Unless their mode of operation changes, groups flounder at the point where people tire of 'just talking.'"18 Second, because the therapeutic bent of much public conversation locates social ills and remedies within individuals or dynamics of interpersonal relationships, public conversations and dialogues risk becoming substitutes for policy formation necessary to correct structural dimensions of social problems. In mimicking the emphasis on the individual in therapy, Cloud warns, the therapeutic rhetoric of "healing, consolation, and adaptation or adjustment" tends to "encourage citizens to perceive political issues, conflicts, and inequities as personal failures subject to personal amelioration."19

#### Evasiveness link

Chandler 7 – Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Democracy

Centre for the Study of Democracy, Westminster, Area, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 118-119

This disjunction between the human/ethical/global causes of post-territorial political activism and the capacity to 'make a difference' is what makes these individuated claims immediately abstract and metaphysical – there is no specific demand or programme or attempt to build a collective project. This is the politics of symbolism. The rise of symbolic activism is highlighted in the increasingly popular framework of 'raising awareness'– here there is no longer even a formal connection between ethical activity and intended outcomes (Pupavac 2006). Raising awareness about issues has replaced even the pretense of taking responsibility for engaging with the world – the act is ethical in-itself. Probably the most high profile example of awareness raising is the shift from Live Aid, which at least attempted to measure its consequences in fund-raising terms, to Live 8 whose goal was solely that of raising an 'awareness of poverty'. The struggle for 'awareness' makes it clear that the focus of symbolic politics is the individual and their desire to elaborate upon their identity – to make us aware of their 'awareness', rather than to engage us in an instrumental project of changing or engaging with the outside world. It would appear that in freeing politics from the constraints of territorial political community there is a danger that political activity is freed from any constraints of social mediation(see further, Chandler 2004a). Without being forced to test and hone our arguments, or even to clearly articulate them, we can rest on the radical 'incommunicability' of our personal identities and claims – you are 'either with us or against us'; engaging with those who disagree is no longer possible or even desirable. It is this lack of desire to engage which most distinguishes the un-mediated activism of post-territorial political actors from the old politics of territorial communities, founded on struggles of collective interests (Chandler 2004b). The clearest example is old representational politics – this forced engagement in order to win the votes of people necessary for political parties to assume political power. Individuals with a belief in a collective programme knocked on strangers' doors and were willing to engage with them, not on the basis of personal feelings but on what they understood were their potential shared interests. Few people would engage in this type of campaigning today; engaging with people who do not share our views, in an attempt to change their minds, is increasingly anathema and most people would rather share their individual vulnerabilities or express their identities in protest than attempt to argue with a peer. This paper is not intended to be a nostalgic paean to the old world of collective subjects and national interests or a call for a revival of territorial state-based politics or even to reject global aspirations: quite the reverse. Today, politics has been 'freed' from the constraints of territorial political community – governments without coherent policy programmes do not face the constraints of failure or the constraints of the electorate in any meaningful way; activists, without any collective opposition to relate to, are free to choose their causes and ethical identities; protest, from Al Qaeda, to anti-war demonstrations, to the riots in France, is inchoate and atomized. When attempts are made to formally organize opposition, the ephemeral and incoherent character of protest is immediately apparent.

#### No permutations – direct tradeoff between our method and yours

Cloud 98, Professor of Communication Studies at U of Texas

(Dana, Control and Consolation in American Culture and Politics, pg. xiv)

In response to what Susan Faludi has called an antifeminist backlash in popular culture and politics, feminist activist Gloria Steinem came out with a new plan for a “revolution from within” based on self-esteem. Family support groups were more prominent than antiwar activism during the Persian Gulf War, and former Marxists and feminists have, since the collapse of Stalinism, hailed a politics of self-expression, consciousness-raising, and social fragmentation as the new avenue for change. Meanwhile, psychotherapists have taken to the airwaves, as talk show hosts with the help of talk show psychologists, attempt to resolve their guests’ conflicts in the space of minutes. Talk show producer Mary Duffy explained to a New York Times reporter that the therapists are there to “help the audience, too” (Berger 1995, 33). To help the audience with what? Although popularized therapy claims to help individual people with their personal problems, the discourse of therapy serves a broader, cultural function for mass audiences: to offer psychological ministration for the ills of society. A common argument (Flacks 1988, Lasch 1979, Loeb 1994) suggests that since the Vietnam War, American culture and the American people have lost sight of political and social commitment and public responsibility in the narcissistic pursuit of individual interests. As Christopher Lasch wrote more than 15 year ago, “After the political turmoil of the sixties, Americans have retreated to purely personal preoccupations” (29). Scholars and activists on the Left should take warning: What were once political movements have become translated into personal quests for fulfillment. My argument about this social transformation stands in contrast to other perspectives on the therapeutic. Unlike communitarians (Left and Right), who see the retreat into narcissism as a moral failure of our culture, I regard the therapeutic as a political strategy of contemporary capitalism, by which potential dissent is contained within a discourse of individual or family responsibility. Against postmodernists who celebrate the atomization of contemporary culture and proclaim the death of mass collective action for social change, I see a real need to repoliticize issues of power as a precondition for renewed oppositional social movement organizing. In contrast to scholars of liberalism who applaud therapy’s near-exclusive emphasis on individual initiative and personal responsibility, my argument insists on acknowledging the collective and structural features of an unequal social reality in which individuals are embedded and out of which our personal experience, in large part, derives. Racism, sexism, and capitalism pose significant obstacles to individual mobility and well-being; their roles in structuring social reality, however, are obscured in therapeutic discourses that locate the ill not with the society but with the individual or private family. The goals of this book are to develop and argue for a materialist rhetoric of therapy that locates the emergence of therapeutic discourse at a particular historical moment, to link the rise of the therapeutic with particular political and economic interests, and to describe the specific mechanisms by which the therapeutic is a persuasive part of our culture.

#### Aff cant solve – the personal is not political enough

Levitas 03, Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Bristol

(Ruth, Dark Horizons, pg. 23 – 24)

I do not for a moment deny that the utopian spaces of intentional communities may allow different, better relations between people, although, as you observe, they may also be sites of oppression and exploitation. But the existence of these spaces does not seem to me to constitute any major challenge to the more generally dystopian character of political culture. Indeed, the emphasis on the self, the individual, and the private seems to me to be linked to a wider political apathy, and a sense that we can really alter only this micro-level. The dystopian genre is often critical of capitalism: there’s a widespread view that things are not OK, but we live in a culture in which there is no confidence that that things can be otherwise, so utopian energies are restricted to very personal levels. Oliver Bennett describes this as cultural pessimism and draws attention to the prevalence of narratives of economic, moral, and ecological decline. In short, the personal is not political enough. I’m unconvinced about the translation of micro-changes into macro-changes. My quest for Utopia is based on a wish to be different myself, as well as that the world should be otherwise; and I want the world to be otherwise partly because this seems to be a precondition for recovering my own humanity. The danger of this position is that is passes off responsibility for who I am onto external structures and neglects the extent to which, as you say, Utopia is part of the process that must be entered into now, rather than postponed always beyond the horizon. The converse problem is thinking that we can live in what Colin Davis called a Perfect Moral Commonwealth, in which the negative effects of structures are canceled out by individual moral action. Clearly, one must work at both levels. But the general conditions for transformed relations between self and other include a level of material security that capitalism, by its very nature, denies to all but a few.

## 1NR

### 2NC O/V

#### The case studies presented by the negative mobilize effective nonviolent resistance by revealing a silenced history of successful nonviolent confrontation and shed light on successful tactics

Bartkowski 13, Senior Director at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict

(Maciej, Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles, pg. 4)

The case studies in this volume shed light on many key questions, including: What kinds of nonviolent tactics were used in national struggles? What made some nonviolent campaigns successful despite unfavorable conditions and what made others fail or achieve only partial success? What was the impact of diverse acts of civil resistance on the further unfolding of a conflict and its eventual outcomes? How did collective nonviolent actions influence nations, their collective identities, or socioeconomic and political institutions that evolved during the national struggles? Did civil resistance have longer-term consequences on the historical development of these countries? Finally, why do the annals so often ignore the presence and role of civil resistance? By identifying episodes, periods, and specific campaigns of nonviolent resistance that at particular points in time either constituted a dominant or a sole ingredient behind a national liberation struggle, the case studies answer these questions and so encourage new conversation about the nature, place, and role of nonviolent resistance in state and nation formation.

#### The negatives historical re-reading of nonviolence is critical to opening new paths of powerful resistance based on a people power perspective

Bartkowski 13, Senior Director at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict

(Maciej, Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles, pg. 4)

The study of civil resistance presented here represents a paradigmatic shift in the understanding of national struggles and the making of nation-states, which moves away from the traditional focus on structures, conditions, processes, military power, violence, and political elites. This investigation approaches historical knowledge in a novel fashion, recognizing that the force that shapes nations and propels their resistance lies in the organized, purposeful, and defiant actions of an unarmed population. Its nonstate alternative to understanding political power goes against the established Weberian canon of political authority that is top down, centralized, static, material, and elite or institution centric. Instead, the people power perspective emphasizes the fragility and diffused nature of political power, its outside-of-the-state origin, and the agency of ordinary people. Regimes are sustained not merely by their material power, including mechanisms of coercion, but also or primarily by the apathy or ignorance of the common people. The dormant people power becomes apparent with a sudden or gradual collective withdrawal of consent and mass disobedience. This force, according to Mohandas Gandhi (Mahatma), gains its strength from the fact that “even the most powerful cannot rule without the co-operation of the ruled.”

### 2NC AT We are nonviolence

#### An approach which accommodates a diversity of tactics ensures violent takeover – only explicit distancing can allow effective resistance

Domhoff 05, Professor of Sociology at UC Santa Cruz

(William, Social Movements and Strategic Nonviolence, www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/change/science\_nonviolence.html)

This commitment should include the principles put forth by advocates of strategic nonviolence for dealing with pro-violence groups. Nonviolent groups should distance themselves from violent groups and strongly condemn their philosophies and actions. Only groups that specifically state that they are completely committed to strategic nonviolence should be allowed to be co-sponsors of marches and participate in their planning. The thought of openly criticizing and then excluding some activists will make most leftists cringe, not only because their basic values are inclusionary, but because such a step would call to mind past battles over excluding Communists. Those who are excluded will say that the nonviolent activists are the equivalent of "red baiters." They will say that the nonviolent activists have violated their inclusionary principles, and are therefore hypocrites. They will say that those who would exclude them are only reformers and liberals. Most leftists thus prefer to deal with those who favor property damage or armed struggle by ignoring them or making deals with them within the privacy of the movement. That's what the nonviolent activists tried at Seattle. That's what the compromise called "diversity of tactics" is all about. But it won't work. At the same time, it is likely that most future activists would accept strategic nonviolence as their only option if they were socialized into a movement that truly believed in and understand this commitment.

#### The affirmatives discourse of empowerment under conditions of repression creates the potential for violent resistance – replicates David and Goliath logic

Cloud 12, Professor of Communication Studies at U of Texas

(Dana, “David, Goliath, and the Black Panthers: The Paradox of the Oppressed Militant in the Rhetoric of Self-Defense,” Journal of Communication Inquiry 37(1))

Both the Hebrew Bible and the Qur’an tell the story of David and Goliath, in which David, a youth armed only with stones and a sword, challenges and kills the giant Goliath, thus securing the victory of the Israelites over the Philistines. The event was a military victory; it also created and secured the identity of a people with a sense of its own power. Today the phrase “David and Goliath” is used as shorthand to refer to a situation in which a smaller or significantly weaker force defeats a larger and much more powerful one. In this article, we develop a framework for examining the David and Goliath narrative when it is used as a rhetorical strategy in political and social movement discourse. We argue that the stance of the aggrieved Party (David) is a rhetorical resource that serves two functions for both mainstream political and oppositional social movement actors. First, it potentially legitimizes the use of violence in a social conflict by figuring political collectives as aggrieved victims. Second, it crafts a paradoxical collective persona: that of an oppressed militant (in the case of social movements) or a mighty victim (in the case of hegemonic powers), an agent who is at once both powerful and oppressed. It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze in detail the disparate treatment by the media of oppressed militants (framed negatively) and the hegemonic stance of “righteous victim” used to justify wars against weaker foes (framed positively). However, we make a note of this distinction’s importance toward the conclusion of this article. Elsewhere (Cloud & Gatchet, 2008), we argue that mainstream mass media and, by extension, the publics they influence, tacitly and problematically regard the violence of established powerful entities as more credible than self-defense among oppressed groups. Here we focus on the first dimension of the David and Goliath narrative by exploring the rhetoric of militancy among the oppressed as developed by members of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. While there is extensive research about rhetorics warranting the violence of nation states, there is less research addressing the questions: How do movements for social change by oppressed groups warrant their turn to violence? What functions does a movement’s claim to the right of self-defense serve in the creation of the identity of its participants? Finally, how do dominant interests and mainstream media take up movement arguments about violence, and with what consequences? In order to answer these questions, we examine the rhetoric and U.S. news media framing of the Black Panthers during the late 1960s.1 Based on this analysis, we argue that members of the Black Panther Party (BPP) rhetorically crafted a David-like persona to warrant the taking up of arms in self-defense. The Panthers utilized the David stance in their rhetoric of self-defense in two distinct ways. First, Panthers advocated armed self-defense as a necessary and righteous move against an invading and exploitative, even monstrous, enemy. Second, and perhaps more importantly, members of the Party recognized their militant stance as one that allowed Black Americans to define themselves as an oppressed but potentially powerful group. This latter strategy is characteristic of the construction of an agentive identity for social movements against oppression. However, mainstream media outlets often framed the BPP as a Goliath like threat, ignoring or diminishing Panther grievances regarding the systematic oppression faced by members of inner-city Black communities at the hands of state and local police and often describing the BPP movement as equal with these dominant governmental powers in its assumption of the prerogative of violence. We argue that these frames are significant in managing the public meaning of political violence, from social movements and assassination attempts to terrorism and preemptive war.

### 2NC AT white philosophy

#### Nonviolence is not a tool of whiteness – it has been developed and successfully deployed by people of color. The affirmatives argument is part of the historical cover up to valorize violence

Lakey 01 --- the director of Training for Change, began his career as a trainer at the Martin Luther King School for Social Change, and has since gone on to lead over 1000 workshops on five continent (March 2001, George, “Nonviolent Action as the Sword that Heals; Challenging Ward Churchill's "Pacifism As Pathology"” <http://www.trainingforchange.org/nonviolent_action_sword_that_heals)>)

Is nonviolent action a "white thing"? That would be a big surprise to the hundreds of thousands of people of color in the U.S. who have used nonviolent direct action in campaigns for over a century. (In 1876 in St. Louis African Americans were doing freedom rides against discrimination on trolley cars, to take one of thousands of examples.) In any given week there are community-based organizations of people of color, all across the U.S., who are engaged in nonviolent action: marches, sit-ins, street blockades, boycotts, civil disobedience, and the like. Books could be written just about the unions of people of color, like the hospital workers, hotel workers and janitors, who go out on strike as well as using other tactics. A far, far higher proportion of people of color have engaged in nonviolent action in the U.S. than have white people, and continue to do so year in and year out. Not to mention the role of nonviolence in the anti-colonial struggles in Africa and Asia. When we think of nonviolence, why do the names of Gandhi, King, Aung San Suu Kyi, Cesar Chavez, so easily leap to mind? They are only the tip of the iceberg. Neither the mass media nor the schools have served us well in letting us know what's really going on. They glamorize violence. It's up to us activists to spread the information about people power. How many activists know that Kwame Nkrumah led a successful nonviolent campaign for Ghana's independence in the '50s? Or that Kenneth Kaunda led another in Zambia in the '60s? The successful struggle of Nepalese students for greater democracy just a few years ago? The prolonged nonviolent campaign for democracy in Taiwan which withstood torture, killings, and widespread suffering before success came in the '90s? The strategic shift of the ANC to major reliance on nonviolent action in the early '80s, leading to the end of apartheid government? The heroic 1990 struggle of the Mohawks in Quebec which saved ancestral land from being turned into a white golf course? (9) I won't even start with the myth that nonviolent action is inherently middle class -- that's even more off base than the myth that it's white. A far higher proportion of working class people have engaged in nonviolent action than middle class people. Since unions have been the "shock troops" of class struggle, to read their history is to read a large part of the history of nonviolent action in the U.S.